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Abstract
Order flow in equity markets is remarkably persistent in the sense that order signs (to
buy or sell) are positively autocorrelated out to time lags of tens of thousands of orders,
corresponding to many days. Two possible explanations are herding, corresponding to
positive correlation in the behavior of different investors, or order splitting, correspond-
ing to positive autocorrelation in the behavior of single investors. We investigate this
using order flow data from the London Stock Exchange for which we have membership
identifiers. By formulating models for herding and order splitting, as well as models for
brokerage choice, we are able to overcome the distortion introduced by brokerage. On
timescales of less than a few hours the persistence of order flow is overwhelmingly due
to splitting rather than herding. We also study the properties of brokerage order flow
and show that it is remarkably consistent both cross-sectionally and longitudinally.
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1. Introduction
Order flow in equity markets, defined as the process assuming value one for buyer initi-
ated trades and minus one for seller initiated trades, is persistent in the sense that orders
to buy tend to be followed by more orders to buy and orders to sell tend to be followed
by more orders to sell. Positive serial autocorrelation for the first autocorrelation of or-
der flow has been observed in many different markets5. In fact, order flow is remarkably
persistent: As illustrated in Figure 1, all the coefficients of the autocorrelation function
of signed order flow are positive out to large lags, corresponding in trade time to tens of
thousands of transactions or in real time to many days6. This is highly consistent across
different markets, stocks, and time periods.
In this paper we perform an empirical study to elucidate the cause of this remarkable
persistence. This study is based on a unique data set from the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) with codes indicating the exchange member who executed each order. Members
of the exchange may trade for their own accounts, but they may also act as brokers for
investors who are not members of the exchange7. As we will argue here, this provides
useful information about the patterns of behavior of investors8, even if it falls short of the
fine grained data on the identity of investors that would make the results unequivocal.
Our goal here is to distinguish between two fundamentally different types of behavior,
order splitting and herding. Order splitting occurs when single investors split desired
large trades into smaller pieces and execute them gradually. Our results here add to
earlier evidence that order splitting is an important effect. The strategic motivations
for order splitting were originally derived by Kyle (1985), who showed that an informed
trader with a monopoly on private information would trade gradually in order to reduce
impact. Early empirical studies by Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) using brokerage
data with information about investors showed that order splitting is widespread. Chor-
dia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002, 2005) found that daily order imbalances are serially
5 Positive autocorrelation for a single lag was observed in the Paris Bourse by Biais, Hillion and
Spatt (1995), in foreign exchange markets by Danielsson and Payne (2012), and in the NYSE by Ellul
et al. (2007) and Yeo (2008). See also Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002, 2005).
6 The extreme persistence of order flow was independently pointed out by Bouchaud et al. (2004)
and Lillo and Farmer (2004). In fact order flow is so persistent that it is a long-memory process, i.e.
its autocorrelation function is non-integrable (Beran, 1994). This has been shown for the London and
New York stock exchanges by Lillo and Farmer (2004), for the Paris stock exchange by Bouchaud et
al. (2004) and for the Spanish stock exchange by Vaglica et al. (2008) and Moro et al. (2009). Note
that Axioglou and Skouras (2011) argue that order flow is much more persistent within a given day
than across successive days. None of our results here depend on long-memory; we mention this only to
emphasize the extreme persistence of order flow.
7 We often use the terms “member” and “broker” interchangeably.
8 By investor we mean any trading entity with a coherent trading strategy. This could correspond to
a specific trading account within an institution such as an investment bank or hedge fund, or a private
individual trading for his or her own account.
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Figure 1: Autocorrelation function of order flow for the stock AZN in the first half of 2009, plotted
on double logarithmic scale. The time lag τ is measured in terms of number of effective market order
placements, where an effective market order is any order that results in an immediate transaction. To
reduce estimation error we use order signs rather than order size and individual autocorrelations are
binned for large lags. The results are similar if we use order volume.
autocorrelated and highly persistent9, and pointed out that they can be caused either
by order splitting or herding. Lillo, Mike and Farmer (2005) introduced a model for
order splitting connecting the size of large orders with the autocorrelation of order flow
and showed that its predictions gave good agreement with data from the London Stock
Exchange. Gerig (2007), demonstrated that for the LSE stock AZN the trades coming
from the same brokerage have long-memory, whereas trades from different brokerages do
not (see also Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009)). Vaglica et al. (2008) reconstructed
the size of large orders from brokerage data and found that it is distributed as predicted
by Lillo, Mike and Farmer.
An alternate hypothesis is that the extreme persistence of order flow is due to herding,
as proposed by LeBaron and Yamamoto (2007; 2008), who constructed an agent-based
9 Order imbalance for each stock over any time interval is typically calculated using the difference
in the number of buy market orders and sell market orders, or the difference in the dollar value from
buy market orders and sell market orders. Variations of this metric can use either a scaling factor
or calculating a ratio instead of a difference. Brown, Walsh, and Yuen (1997), Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2002), Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005),
Lo and Coggins (2006), Boehmer and Wu (2006) found correlation between order imbalance and returns,
however, the evidences are not consistent on the direction of causality. Looking at 5 minute order
imbalances, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) have found that return predictability has declined
over time.
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model of imitation that produces highly persistent order flow. There is a large literature
on herding and its existence in equity trading at longer timescales is well-documented10.
There are many strategic reasons why agents might herd, including reputational consid-
erations, delayed response to public information, slow diffusion of private information,
or imitation based on inferring the private information of others.
Thus there are good arguments that one should expect both order splitting and herd-
ing. Here we study the London Stock Exchange to quantitatively estimate their relative
importance at short timescales, and in particular the extent to which these two mecha-
nisms influence the observed persistent autocorrelation of order flow. The paper that is
most comparable to ours is Lee, Liu, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2004), who studied daily
autocorrelations in order flow imbalances in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and inferred
the presence of order splitting vs. herding. Their data contained identifiers for investors
at a fine-grained level. They aggregated the data into three categories corresponding
to individuals, domestic institutions, or foreign institutions, further subdividing each of
these into large or small, to create six groups in all. They then studied the autocorre-
lations of the order flow of each group, comparing the results with or without deleting
the trades of agents in the same group. The change in the autocorrelation was used to
infer splitting vs. herding, with results they interpreted as supporting both splitting and
herding to varying degrees for each group.
The fact that our data contains only brokerage level data poses a greater challenge
for data analysis. Whereas Lee et al. (2004) could aggregate their data using categories
they were given by the exchange, a given brokerage potentially aggregates data from
many different kinds of investors, and so it is not obvious a priori that this provides
any useful granular information about single investors. What we demonstrate here, is
that at least for the question at hand, there is in fact enough information to make useful
inferences.
We make both methodological and empirical contributions to the literature in several
different ways. First, we extend the work of Lee et al. (2004) by formalizing their
approach to decomposing order flow. Second, we develop idealized models for order
splitting and herding of single investors and compute the corresponding decomposition
of order flow for each of these models. Third, we introduce the concept of a brokerage
map, which models how brokerages aggregate the orders of single investors. Fourth, we
combine the second and third contributions by computing the effect of brokerage for
our models of individual investors. Fifth, we apply this to empirically study the data,
10 See for example (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Banerjee,
1992, 1993; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman, 1994;
Orlean, 1995; Raafat, Chater, and Frith, 2009; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009). Several previous studies
have focused on the effect of communication network structure on price fluctuations; see (Kirman and
Teyssiere, 2002; Iori, 2002; Cont and Bouchaud, 2000; Tedeschi, Iori, and Gallegati, 2009). Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Wermers (1999) find only weak evidence for herding.
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using our combined results in the fourth step to compare the data to well-formulated
null hypotheses. This allows us to place bounds on the relative importance of herding
vs. splitting by individuals in causing the persistent autocorrelation of order flow.
From an empirical point of view we contribute to the literature by performing a
systematic study of a large high frequency data set containing brokerage identifiers. We
systematically analyze six stocks in the London Stock Exchange over a period of ten
years, a sample of more than 39 million orders. We perform this analysis at the level of
individual orders, on timescales ranging from that of individual order submissions up to
a few hours (at longer timescales we begin to lose statistical significance in our results).
Our main finding is that the dominant cause of persistence in order flow is the auto-
correlated behavior of individual brokerages, rather than correlated order flow between
brokerages. While there is some evidence for flows between brokerages, these are small
compared with the persistence of order flow for individual brokerages. By using the
null hypotheses that we develop for investor behavior and brokerage we argue that this
very likely reflects properties of single investors, and supports the hypothesis that order
splitting is more important than herding at high frequencies11.
We wish to stress, however, that we are not disputing the well-documented existence
of herding at low frequencies. For example, Lu and Fang (2012) have used quarterly
holdings of mutual funds to document herding in the LSE. This timescale is almost two
orders of magnitude slower than that studied here, and was not focused on explaining
the persistence of order flow. In addition our results do not contradict the earlier study12
based on LSE data by Taylor (2003).
Our results here have other interesting implications. When we compare the data
for different exchange members we find that for the largest members the behavior is
surprisingly homogenous: thirteen out of the fifteen largest members all have more or
less identical correlations in their order flow. Another interesting conclusion is that we
are able to place bounds on the behavior of investors in choosing brokers. In particular
our empirical analysis, combined with our models of brokerage, makes it clear that
investors work with only a small subset of brokers, and that dynamical variation in the
choice of brokers is limited. Finally we observe that the dominance of flows from the
same brokers is constant across a nearly ten year period, despite the rise of algorithmic
brokerage services during that period.
11 Since obtaining the results presented here one of us (FL) has verified the main conclusions of the
paper using a unique dataset for the Russian stock market which contains agent-level identifiers.
12 Taylor (2003) did regressions for time series of count data, such as the number of transactions in
a given interval, and found that lagged values had positive and statistically significant contributions.
Although he interpreted this as “herding” he does not distinguish between herding and splitting as we
do here, and since his data did not involve signed order flow, it relates more directly to trading volume
than order imbalances.
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The cause of the persistence of order flow has important economic consequences.
Under the herding hypothesis the persistence of order flow is due to slow propagation
of information, either slow reaction to public information or slow diffusion of private
information, so that information is only gradually incorporated into prices. In contrast,
order splitting suggests that individuals receive private information (which in order to
be new must be uncorrelated with past information arrival) and only trade gradually for
strategic reasons. As with herding, information is only slowly incorporated into prices,
but for very different reasons. Order splitting in the strong form that we observe here
implies that the market deviates substantially from the equilibrium that would prevail
if all participants were forced to reveal their true intentions at the outset of trading.
The persistence of order flow also has important economic consequences because it
places strong constraints on the interaction of order flow and prices, which has implica-
tions for market impact13. While the individual autocorrelation coefficients of order flow
at each lag are small, the fact that they are all positive implies substantial predictability
over long time horizons14. At the same time, in an efficient market the autocorrelation
of price returns must be small. Lillo and Farmer (2004) have argued that under the
assumption that market impact is permanent this implies that liquidity is asymmetric
between buying and selling in a time varying manner; Bouchaud et al. (2004; 2006) have
argued that this can also be resolved if impact is completely temporary, albeit decaying
extremely slowly15.
The presence or absence of order splitting affects the functional form of market im-
pact, i.e. the dependence of price changes on order size. Huberman and Stanzl (2004)
have shown that if liquidity is constant then permanent impact must be linear to avoid ar-
bitrage; however, when liquidity is time varying, other functional forms become possible,
see Gatheral (2010). The results cited above show that liquidity is indeed time varying,
and empirical studies suggest that market impact is concave. Under the assumption that
trades are bundled by brokers and executed by order splitting algorithms, Farmer et al.
(2013) show that the autocorrelation function of order flow determines the functional
form of the market impact of large institutional orders, including both its permanent
and temporary components. Their derivation does not apply if the persistence of order
flow is due to herding. Thus our results here provide important background information
relating to the nature of market impact.
13 For a comprehensive summary see Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009).
14 For an ARMA process predictability decays exponentially in time; for a long-memory process
predictability decays as a power law, which is asymptotically much slower.
15 See also Farmer et al. (2006), Gerig (2007) and Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009) for a detailed
discussion of the sense in which these are equivalent. More recent work by Eisler, Bouchaud, and
Kockelkoren (2011a) shows that when limit orders and cancellations are taken into account these models
are not equivalent.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. In
Section 3 we derive a decomposition of the autocorrelation function of order flow into
that due to the same agent vs. that due to other agents. In Section 4 we develop
models for herding and splitting by investors, and compute their decomposition. In
Section 5 we develop models for brokerage and compute how brokerage distorts the
decomposition of autocorrelation when combined with the investor models developed in
the previous section. In Section 6 we apply our methods to the data and demonstrate the
dominance of the contribution to the autocorrelation of brokerages with themselves vs.
other brokerages. We also test the data against the null hypotheses developed earlier
and argue that this very likely reflects the behavior of investors. We also study the
heterogeneity of exchange members and show that most of them are extremely persistent
in terms of both trade direction and the clustering in time of their trades. In Section 7
we investigate the negative contribution of herding to the autocorrelation function more
carefully, and show that it is driven by heterogeneity in the response of investors to
market orders that change the price, versus those that do not. In the conclusions we
summarize and reflect on the economic implications of our results.
2. Data
This study is performed using data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE). There
are two parallel markets, the on-book market (SETS) and the off-book market (SEAQ).
In the on-book market trades take place via a fully automatic electronic order matching
system, while in the off-book market trades are arranged bilaterally via phone calls.
We restrict our study to the on-book market16. Note that there are no official market
makers, though it is possible for any member firm to act as a market maker by posting
bids and offers simultaneously.
We study six stocks in the period from June 2000 to June 2009, with the exception
of a six month period from January to May in 2003. We divide the data for each stock
into 17 subperiods of six months each, for a total of 17×6 = 102 samples. The six stocks
we study are AstraZeneca (AZN), BHP Billiton (BLT), British Sky Broadcasting Group
(BSY), Lloyds Banking Group (LLOY), Prudential (PRU), Vodafone Group (VOD)17.
In cases where we present data for only one period we will use AZN in the first half of
2009. In this period the typical number of market orders per day is between 4, 000 and
5, 000. The number of market orders in each sample ranges from 91, 710 to 1, 416, 000,
with an average of 382, 500.
16Given also the long time span and the equity markets restructuring in recent years, it is difficult to
estimate the fraction of volume traded on the on-book market. Carollo et al. (2012) estimate that it
ranges between 40% and 57% for nine highly liquid stocks traded at LSE in 2004.
17 We have also investigated other stocks and found similar results.
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Our data set contains all orders placed in the on-book market. The aspect of this
data that makes it unique is that each order is characterized by a code identifying the
member who placed the order18. The number of members varies throughout the sample,
but there are typically about 100 members. To avoid data with poor statistics, in
each six month period we remove members who make less than 100 transactions across
the full period, which typically leaves about 80 active members. The activity level is
very heterogeneous. For example, the 5 most active market members are responsible
for 40-50% of transactions and the 15 most active ones are responsible for 80-90% of
transactions. The value of the Gini coefficient of member activity averaged across the
102 samples is 0.87. This is quite consistent across stocks and time periods, with a
standard deviation of only 0.02. Thus the trading activity is strongly concentrated in a
relatively small number of member firms.
We have performed the analysis given here in three different ways: (1) market order
signs t, where a market order is defined as any event that results in an immediate
transaction; (2) signs of all orders, including both market and limit orders; (3) signed
volume vt of transactions. The results are similar in all three cases, except that for
signed volume they are somewhat noisier. We present only the results for case (1),
market order signs. The number of market orders is used to measure time, i.e. t′ = t+ 1
whenever there is a market order placement. As a final methodological note, we do not
need to infer whether the trade is buyer or seller initiated by comparing the trade and
the prevailing quote price, because our data contain explicitly the information on the
sign of the trade.
3. Decomposing order flow
In this section we present two decompositions of the autocorrelation of order flow
that will serve as the basis for our empirical analysis.
Consider a time series of orders of sign t, where t = +1 for buy orders and t = −1
for sell orders. For convenience we measure time in terms of order arrivals, so that time
advances by one unit every time a new order arrives. We define the signed order flow
18 We do not have the actual names of the members, but rather anonymized codes uniquely identifying
each member. For the period 2000-2002 we are only able to track members for one month, because in
this part of the data codes are reshuffled each month. Because we are operating on timescales of at
most a few hours this does not affect the results.
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it to be zero if the order at time t was not placed by agent i and to be the order sign
otherwise, i.e.
it = 1 => buy order placed by agent i
it = 0 => order placed by another agent
it = −1 => sell order placed by agent i.
For now we leave it open whether the agent is an individual investor or whether the
agent is a brokerage; this will become clear in context. As already mentioned in Section
2 the analysis can be performed using market orders (as we have done here), all orders,
or with signed order volumes, with similar results.
Let N be the length of the time series, N i be the number of orders due to agent i and
N ij(τ) the number of times that an order from agent i at time t is followed by an order
from agent j at time t+ τ . Similarly, let P i = N i/N be the fraction of orders placed by
agent i, and P ij(τ) = N ij(τ)/N be the fraction of times that an order from agent i at
time t is followed by an order from agent j at time t+ τ . The weighting function P ij(τ)
captures the extent to which agents i and j tend to be active with a given time lag τ ,
regardless of the sign of their orders. If agents act independently then in the large N
limit:
P ij(τ) = P iP j ∀i, j,
and P ij(τ) is independent of τ . Deviations from independence can be characterized by
P˜ ij(τ) ≡ P ij(τ)− P iP j. (1)
Finally, let the sample mean of the order sign for agent i be
µi ≡ 1
N i
∑
t
it.
The sample autocorrelation in the order signs of agents i and j can then be written
Cij(τ) ≡ 1
N ij(τ)
∑
t
it
j
t+τ − µiµj. (2)
3.1. Decomposition by agent identity
As shown in the Appendix, the autocorrelation function of order flow can be written
C(τ) =
∑
i,j
P ij(τ)Cij(τ) +
∑
i,j
P˜ ij(τ)µiµj. (3)
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This can trivially be written in the form
C(τ) = Csame(τ) + Cother(τ), (4)
where
Csame(τ) ≡
∑
i
P ii(τ)Cii(τ) +
∑
i
P˜ ii(τ)(µi)2, (5)
Cother(τ) ≡
∑
i 6=j
P ij(τ)Cij(τ) +
∑
i 6=j
P˜ ij(τ)µiµj.
Csame(τ) includes only the diagonal contributions, and is the autocorrelation of orders
coming from the same agent. In contrast Cother(τ) includes the off-diagonal contributions
and so is the autocorrelation of orders coming from different agents. As we will argue
in the next section this is related to the relative contributions of splitting vs herding.
Eq. (4) can be trivially rewritten as
Csame(τ)
C(τ)
+
Cother(τ)
C(τ)
= 1.
Thus all the information about the decomposition is contained in the ratio
S(τ) =
Csame(τ)
C(τ)
= 1− Cother(τ)
C(τ)
. (6)
For convenience we will sometimes characterize the decomposition of order flow based
on agent identity in terms of S(τ).
3.2. Decomposition by correlation of trading sign vs. timing of activity
It is useful to compare the first and second terms of the decomposition in Eq. (3).
The first term weights the correlation of order signs by the activity P ij(τ), and the
second term weights deviations in activity by the mean order signs µi and µj. Since
buying and selling roughly balance, for large samples µi is small and the second term is
negligible19. Typical values for our dataset are |µi| = 0.03 and ∑i,j P˜ ij(1)µiµj = 10−4.
19 It is not surprising that this term is small – in the long-run one expects µi to be close to zero. If
it represents signed trading volume, for example, then
∑
t 
i
t is the total inventory change during the
period of the study. If the inventory remains bounded, then µi → 0 in the limit N → ∞. Even if it
represents order signs, then if agents buy as often as they sell, µi is small.
10
Thus the first term of Eq. (3) is three orders of magnitude larger than the second one,
and it is a very good approximation to take
C(τ) '
∑
i,j
P ij(τ)Cij(τ). (7)
Similar approximations can be used for Csame(τ) and Cother(τ). One can think of the
autocorrelation as a product of two terms, one that depends on activity, as reflected by
P ij(τ), and the other that depends on trading direction, as reflected by Cij(τ).
We have thus decomposed order flow in two different ways: Eq. (5) decomposes the
total autocorrelation C(t) into the contribution Csame due to the same agent vs. the
contribution Cother due to different agents. In contrast, Eq. (7) decomposes contributions
due to trading direction (buying versus selling) versus activity clustering (when agents
make their trades).
4. Models for splitting and herding
In order to use the decompositions developed in the previous section to understand
the relative importance of splitting vs. herding we first need to understand how these
agent behaviors affect the decomposition of the autocorrelation into same vs. other. At
first glance this might seem to be trivial. Splitting necessarily involves autocorrelations
induced by the same agent, so if Csame > Cother then one would naturally infer that
splitting is the dominant cause of the persistence of order flow. Similarly, since herding
involves interactions of agents with each other, then if Cother > Csame it would seem
that we could naturally infer that herding is the dominant cause. However, things are
not quite so simple. The basic reason is that herding can involve complicated feed-
back between agents, who generate a mixture of correlations with each other and with
themselves.
To make this clearer we formulate explicit models of both splitting and herding.
The model of splitting is straightforward, but there are many ways to model herding,
corresponding to the many forms in which herding can occur. It is useful to distinguish
between herding based on a common response to public information and herding based
on the endogenous dynamics of investors who are responding to each others’ private
information. We provide an example of each. There are of course many variations; we
make some arbitrary choices, aiming for simplicity. As we will argue later by comparing
several different models for herding, the results are very robust and the main conclusions
are not sensitive to the details.
For the purposes of this section one should interpret an agent as a single investor.
As stated in the introduction, by single investor we mean an agent who is trading for a
11
given account using a well defined and consistent strategy (in contrast to a broker – see
the next section).
4.1. Order splitting
Under order splitting the autocorrelation of order flow is generated entirely by in-
vestors who split large trades into small pieces and execute them incrementally. Under
the assumption that all persistence is due to order splitting, we assume that information
is private and IID. Since by assumption the autocorrelation between different investors
is zero, the persistence is entirely due to splitting, and
Csame(τ) = C(τ),
Cother(τ) = 0. (8)
Furthermore order splitting implies Csame(τ) > 0, as discussed in Lillo, Mike, and Farmer
(2005).
If the information arrival is not IID it is of course possible that Csame(τ) > 0 due
to a cause other than splitting, such as positive autocorrelation in information arrival.
If we can only observe trades and have no further information about the information
or intentions of the investors then we will not be able to make this distinction. The
reader should bear this in mind: Order splitting is an example of a process that causes
C(τ) = Csame(τ), but it is not the only example.
4.2. Herding model I: Public information
This model captures the idea of herding as a response to a common external cause,
i.e. a herd that is directed from outside by public information. It has the important
advantage of being trivial to compute.
Assume an information signal It′ taking on positive and negative integer values. The
sign tells if investors should buy or sell and the absolute value tells how many investors
are affected by the new information. Specifically, the signal is received by It′ investors,
who are chosen randomly (with replacement) from a pool of M possible investors with
probability P i > 0, where
∑M
i=1 P
i = 1. Each of the investors submits an order of size
one whose sign is equal to the sign of It′ . This is repeated at each real time step t
′,
so that when measured in terms of order arrival time t the autocorrelation of the order
flow is C(τ). To the extent that It′ is broadcast to multiple investors the information is
public20.
20 As stated, for blocks of length It′ this model generates sequential orders all of the same sign.
It is possible to make the order flow look more realistic by injecting orders with a random sign, but
the only effect is to decrease the prefactor of the autocorrelation without otherwise affecting its time
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The decomposition of Eq. (5) is easily derived in closed form. Since the investors
are chosen randomly the timing and sign of the trade are independent of the investor,
which implies
Cij(τ) = C(τ), (9)
P ij(τ) = P iP j.
The second of these relations implies that P˜ ij(τ) = 0, ∀i, j. Eq. (5) then implies that
Csame(τ) =
∑
i
P ii(τ)Cii(τ) = C(τ)
∑
i
(P i)2
Cother(τ) =
∑
i 6=j
P ij(τ)Cij(τ) = C(τ)
∑
i 6=j
P iP j.
Defining the investor heterogeneity H as the cross-sectional variance of the investor
trading frequencies P i,
H = Var[P ] =
1
M
∑
i
(P i)2 − 1
M2
, (10)
and substituting for H gives
Csame(τ) = C(τ)
( 1
M
+MH
)
,
Cother(τ) = C(τ)
(M − 1
M
−MH
)
. (11)
The investor heterogeneity H lies in the range 0 ≤ H ≤ (1− 1/M) /M . For a given
M the lower bound occurs when all investors are equally active, i.e. H = Var[P ] = 0,
where
Csame =
C(τ)
M
,
Cother =
M − 1
M
C(τ).
Note that in this case, in the limit M → ∞, Csame(τ) → 0 and Cother(τ) = C(τ).
That is, providing the pool of investors is sufficiently large, the autocorrelation is driven
dependence. The order flow autocorrelation C(τ) depends on the autocorrelation of It′ and its size
distribution P (It′), but these do not affect the decomposition.
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Figure 2: The relative contribution Csame/C vs. Cother/C for the simple herding model, plotted as
a function of the investor heterogeneity H = Var[P ]. Cother/C might normally be interpreted as the
“herding contribution”; this is at its maximum when the investor heterogeneity is zero, and at its
minimum when all the trading is concentrated on a single investor. In contrast for order splitting
Csame = C(τ) independent of the investor heterogeneity.
entirely by Cother(τ). The upper bound occurs when almost all trading is concentrated
in a single investor21, i.e. H = Var[P ] = (1− 1/M) /M , where
Csame = C(τ),
Cother = 0.
If C(τ) > 0 then Csame is always positive and Cother is always non-negative.
As the trading goes from uniformly distributed to concentrated in a single member,
the relative contribution Csame/C grows from 0 to 1 while Cother/C decreases from 1 to
0, as shown in Figure 2. Thus for this simple herding model there is generally a non-zero
contribution to Csame, which grows with investor heterogeneity. This is because there is
a nonzero probability that the same agent will trade more than once during the time it
takes for the correlation to decay.
21 Note that when trading is concentrated on a single investor the value of M is no longer well defined,
so we take the limit P 1 → 1. In this limit the heterogeneity is at a maximum in the sense that the
difference between the trading activity of investors is as large as it can be. We recover Csame = C(τ)
as expected.
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Figure 3: Schematic diagram of herding model II. Assume a fully connected social network. At time t
an agent is chosen randomly with probability P i, who submits an order si = ±1, where si is her state.
At time t+ 1 neighbor j of agent i is chosen at random. With probability p agent j imitates agent i by
submitting order si and changing state to si, and with probability 1− p she ignores agent i, submitting
order sj and keeping her original state sj . This continues for times t + 2, t + 3, etc., choosing all the
neighbors without replacement as needed. At this point a new agent i is chosen at random and the
process is repeated.
4.3. Herding model II: Private information with imitation
Our second herding model produces herding endogenously without need for an exter-
nal coordination mechanism. In this model the investors herd by imitating each other,
and the autocorrelation arises from their collective behavior. We assume that investors
exist within a social network where information is transmitted between neighbors. The
transmission of information depends on the topology of the network, which also deter-
mines the autocorrelation of order flow.
The nodes of the social network correspond to investors and links correspond to
influence. For a schematic diagram of the model see Figure 3. The network is connected,
i.e. all nodes are joined to a common graph by at least one undirected link. Investor i
has a binary state sit = ±1 that indicates whether, all else equal, this investor prefers to
buy or sell. However, with probability p ∈ [0, 1] she may choose to imitate her neighbor.
The order flow is generated using the following algorithm:
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1. At time t an investor i is chosen randomly and an order with sign sit is submitted.
2. t→ t + 1. Consider a neighbor j of investor i. With probability p she imitates i,
and with probability (1− p) she trades on her own information. In more technical
terms, with probability p investor j submits an order jt = s
i
t and changes state to
sjt+1 = s
i
t, and with probability 1 − p she submits an order sjt and preserves her
state, i.e. sjt+1 = s
j
t .
3. If all neighbors of i have been considered go to step (1); otherwise go to step (2)
and choose one of the remaining neighbors (without replacement).
The degree distribution P(`) and the parameter p determine the autocorrelation C(τ)
of the order flow22.
This model has two fixed points, corresponding to the case that all the agents are in
the same state, either si = +1 or si = −1 for all i. However, providing the system is
large and is initially placed in a sufficiently diverse initial configuration, these fixed points
cannot be reached in a reasonable time, and the system will generate time correlated
but otherwise random order flow for a very long time. It is also possible to generalize
the model to inject external information by occasionally randomly altering the sign of
note i in step (1), in which case the system will never settle into a fixed point. Providing
the rate of injection of external information is low, this makes a negligible difference in
C(τ).
For this model we are not able to compute the decomposition (Csame, Cother) in closed
form. Instead we simulate it and compare it to the public information herding model,
tuning the parameters of herding model II so that the autocorrelation function C(τ) is
the same as that of model I. To produce a highly persistent autocorrelation function we
construct a social network using preferential attachment (Simon, 1955; Barabasi, Albert,
and Jeong, 1999). An initial node is created, and then new nodes are incrementally
generated and connected to a randomly chosen pre-existing node with a probability of
attachment proportional to its degree. Because we connect to only one pre-existing node
at a time the resulting graph is a tree23. For the private information herding model the
persistence of order flow derives from the heavy tailed degree distribution of the social
network. The process of imitation converts the scale free power law degree distribution
of the social network, which by construction is of the form P(`) ∼ `−η+1, into order flow
with power law decay of autocorrelations. In fact, in the limit p → 1 it can be shown
that the autocorrelation function decays asymptotically as C(τ) ∼ τ−(η−1).
Simulations such as the one presented in the next section show that Eq. (11) is a
good approximation for the order flow decomposition.
22 The degree of a node of a graph is the number of links connected to that node
23 We could more realistically attach to multiple pre-existing nodes, but this does not affect the
results.
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4.4. Alternative causes of persistent order flow between agents
We want to stress that a large contribution by Cother is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for herding. Herding necessarily involves multiple agents, but the fact that a
mechanism involves multiple agents does not mean that it is necessarily due to herding.
For example Lyons (1997) has documented the existence of a “hot potato” dynamic in
which dealers trade order flow imbalances among one another. Yamamoto (2011) also
showed order switching mechanisms could produce correlated action among agents that
is similar to herding due to shared information. Such mechanisms could cause a non-
zero contribution to Cother, and might be hard to distinguish from herding. As we will
show in the empirical section, for the LSE data Cother is small in comparison to Csame,
so the possibility of alternative mechanisms is a moot point – the necessary condition
for herding is not satisfied. However the reader should bear in mind that when we refer
to “herding” we are allowing for the possibility of alternative mechanisms that make
Cother > 0.
5. Models of brokerage
As described in the introduction, most of the member firms in the LSE are at least
partially acting as brokers, lumping together orders from many investors. Furthermore,
investors may be using multiple brokers, or varying their choice of broker. Given this,
how can we ever hope to make inferences about investors based on data that only
identifies exchange members?
In this section we address the distortion caused by observing brokerage codes rather
than observing investors directly. We introduce the concept of a brokerage map, con-
struct two simple examples, and study how the corresponding order flow decomposition
is altered by brokerage. We also study an example in which the social network and
brokerage relationship are correlated.
Mirroring the same notation that we used for investors, assume there are M ′ brokers
labeled by an index i and P
′i is the trading frequency of broker i. Under the assumption
that all the orders submitted by single investors are passed through by brokers unaltered
on the same time step, the brokerage map B(t) : RM → RM ′ is an M ′×M binary matrix
with entries Bij(t) ∈ {0, 1}, with
∑
iBij(t) = 1. This means that at each time only one
element of each column is different from zero. This element specifies that agent j gives
her order to broker i at time t. Letting j be the order flow for single investors and ′i
for brokerages,
′it =
∑
j
Bij(t)
j
t . (12)
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The brokerage map B(t) in general depends on time and can be deterministic or stochas-
tic24.
In the language of signal processing, in the typical case M ′ < M , brokerage reduces
the observability of order flow. In a manner similar to Eq. (4), the autocorrelation of
brokerage order flow can be written in the form
C ′(τ) = C ′same(τ) + C
′
other(τ). (13)
Because of the assumption that brokers do not delay orders or alter signs, C(τ) = C ′(τ),
i.e. the total autocorrelation is unchanged. In contrast the decomposition (Csame, Cother)
suffers a distortion, i.e. it will be modified to a new decomposition
(Csame, Cother)
B→ (C ′same, C ′other), (14)
which depends on the brokerage map B(t) as well as the single investor order flow i(t).
The goal of this section is to compute the distortion for several simple examples that
can then be used as reference cases for interpreting empirically observed brokerage order
flow.
We now present some results that will allow us to compute the distortion. By making
use of Eqs. (1), (2) and (12), we show in the appendix that under the simplifying
assumption that P˜ij = 0, the autocorrelation for brokerage order flow can be written
C ′(τ) =
∑
i,j,k,l
Bik(τ)Bjl(τ)P
kl(τ)Ckl(τ) (15)
which as before can be split into two components:
C ′same(τ) =
∑
i,k,l
BikBilP
kl(τ)Ckl(τ), (16)
C ′other(τ) =
∑
i 6=j,k,l
BikBjlP
kl(τ)Ckl(τ).
Let P ′i be the brokerage trading frequency, with
∑M
i=1 P
′i = 1. From Eq. (12) the
relation to the trading frequencies P j of individual investors is
P ′i =
∑
j
BijP
j. (17)
24The results on the relation between order flow correlation of agents and of brokers could equivalently
be obtained by defining the matrix B by assuming that its elements are real numbers, summing to one
over columns, and representing the probability that an agent i gives the order to broker j.
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We now use these relations to investigate the distortion due to brokerage using several
idealized models. We investigate three different possibilities, ranging from the best case
to the worst case.
5.1. Fixed random brokerage
We first begin with the best case. Under fixed random brokerage (FRB) each investor
randomly chooses a single broker and thereafter always executes through that broker
only. This implies that each column of Bij has a single element with value one and all
other entries zero, and that B is independent of time. Under fixed random brokerage the
order flow decomposition of the three single investor models presented in the previous
section is distorted as follows:
• Order splitting. The decomposition is unchanged, i.e. C ′same(τ) = C(τ) and
Cother = 0 and there is no distortion. This is because for order splitting the
off-diagonal elements P i 6=j(τ) = Ci 6=j(τ) = 0, and for fixed random brokerage the
fact that only one entry of any column of B is nonzero implies that BikBjk = 0
for i 6= j. Thus in Eq. (16) C ′other(τ) = 0 and therefore Csame(τ) = C(τ). (This is
just a consequence of the obvious fact that all the order flow of a single investor
splitting orders stays inside that investor’s brokerage).
• Public information herding model. The decomposition is given by Eq. (11), except
that M is replaced by M ′ and H = Var[P ] is replaced by H′ = Var[P ′], i.e.
C ′same(τ)
C ′(τ)
=
1
M ′
+M ′H′,
C ′other(τ)
C ′(τ)
=
M ′ − 1
M ′
−M ′H′. (18)
This can be seen from the fact that for the public information herding model
P ij = P iP j and C ′ij = C ′(τ). Using Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), and the definition
of H′ (as in Section 4.2) gives the result. The size of the distortion thus depends
on the reduction in the dimensionality of the space from M to M ′ as well as the
change in the heterogeneity from H and H′. The effect of the distortion is to make
pure herding at the level of investors acquire a stronger Csame component, making
it look more like splitting25.
25 While it might seem surprising that this no longer depends on M or H, one should bear in mind
that under fixed random brokerage we are assuming the correlation between order flow at the level of
investors is independent of their broker. Furthermore, M and H have to be consistent with the set
{P ′i}. Since behavior below the level of the brokerage is not observable, the trading of any investor
within a given brokerage has the same effect, and the results are as if there were M ′ rather than M
investors with variance Var[P ′]
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the autocorrelation of order flow for the two herding models using a
fixed random brokerage map. For the private information (imitation) model, order flow is generated
as described in the text, and the splitting (blue triangles) and herding (red circles) contributions are
computed numerically using Eq. (5). For the public information herding model we assume the same
total autocorrelation C(τ) (black dashed line) as the imitation model, and compute the splitting (blue
dots) and herding (red line) contributions using Eq. (18). Broker trading frequencies P
′i are chosen to
match AZN in the first half of 2009. Herding strongly dominates splitting and the decomposition for
the two models is nearly identical.
• Private information herding model. We cannot prove the decomposition in this
case. However, as explained below, numerical simulations make it clear that the
private information model produces results that are virtually identical to the public
information model.
The private and public information herding models are compared in Figure 4, where
we calibrate to match AZN during the first half of 2009. In both cases we construct a
fixed random brokerage map with M ′ = 50 brokers whose trading frequencies P ′i are
matched to the 50 largest exchange members for AZN during the first half of 2009. For
the private information model we build an investor social network as described in the
previous section with imitation frequency p = 0.9 and M = 10, 000 investors, running
simulations for 106 time steps. The decomposition for the public information model
is easily computed by calculating H′ from Eq. (10) with M ′ = 50 and plugging into
Eq. (18). The resulting decomposition for the two herding models is nearly identical.
In both cases the resulting decomposition is completely dominated by the herding com-
ponent. While there is a non-zero splitting component, it is more than an order of
magnitude smaller.
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Thus for order splitting the fixed random brokerage map introduces no distortion,
whereas for herding models the distortion is dependent on the number of brokers and
the heterogeneity of their trading frequencies. The distortion induced for the London
Stock Exchange is reasonably small. Stating this in more quantitative terms, from
Eq. (11) we know that at the level of single investors, providing the order flow is spread
across a large number of investors, we expect S(τ) = Csame(τ)/C(τ) ≈ 0. If we instead
observe the same order flow through brokerages, under the fixed random brokerage
model, for the LSE we have M ′ ≈ 80 and H ≈ 10−3, which according to Eq. (18) gives
S ′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C(τ) ≈ 0.09. The distortion is thus only about 9%, i.e. the false
splitting term is small.
5.2. Dynamically random brokerage
We now investigate the worst case. To conceal order flow some investors may vary
their choice of brokers. Dynamically random brokerage captures this strategy in its
extreme form: Under dynamical random brokerage, Bij(t) is dynamically random: On
every trade each investor randomly chooses a (typically new) broker according to the
broker trading frequencies P
′i. There is no memory of the past, and no allegiance of any
investor to any broker. Thus in this case brokerage level order flow carries no information
whatsoever about single investors.
What would we observe in this case? The decomposition is easy to compute: Random
choice implies that P
′ij = P
′iP
′j, and therefore the decomposition is once again given by
Eq. (18). The resulting decomposition is thus identical to that of the public information
herding model under a fixed random broker map.
We have the interesting result that dynamically random brokerage creates the ap-
pearance of herding, regardless of what the investors are actually doing. In contrast
to fixed random brokerage, the distortion for herding is small and the distortion for
splitting is large. To make this more explicit, assume the same values for the London
Stock Exchange used in the previous section. If single investors are herding, dynami-
cally random brokerage creates a false non-zero splitting ratio S ′(τ) ≈ 9%, the same as
that for fixed random brokerage. But for pure order splitting, the splitting ratio S(τ)
is reduced to 9%, in contrast to the correct value of 100% for fixed random brokerage.
This asymmetry is key to allowing us to draw firm conclusions based on brokerage data.
5.3. Joint model where the social network correlates trading and brokerage
The previous models treat trading and brokerage as independent. What if the trading
behavior of investors is correlated with their choice of brokers? To study this question
we have generalized the private information herding model to allow for the possibility
that neighbors in the influence network also tend to use the same broker.
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Figure 5: A decomposition of the autocorrelation of the order flow into C ′(τ) = C ′same(τ) +C
′
other(τ)
according to Eq. (4) based on exchange membership identifiers. The horizontal axis is plotted on
logarithmic scale and the vertical axis on linear scale. C ′same(τ) dominates at all lags. Note the
negativity of C ′other(τ) for τ > 10. Here we show AZN in the first half of 2009, but all of the 102
samples look very similar.
In the generalized private information model the social network and the brokerage
assignments are made in tandem. As we construct the social network, when we attach
each new investor to a previous investor, we assign the same broker with probability Φ
or a random broker with probability 1 − Φ. As a result there is a correlation between
neighborhood relationships in the trading graph and brokerage assignment26. This cor-
relation causes a higher level of distortion for the obvious reason that it means that
two investors who frequently mimic each other tend to trade through the same broker,
making them look like they are a single investor splitting orders.
For this model we can only compute the distortion numerically; the results are pre-
sented in the next section when we compare to empirical data.
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Figure 6: The decomposition of the autocorrelation for the ensemble of stocks illustrates the consistency
with which C ′same(τ) dominates C
′
other(τ). Left panel: Autocorrelations of market order signs averaged
across all 102 samples (spanning nine years and six stocks). The bars are standard deviations. Right
panel: C ′other(τ) in the left panel is magnified to better observe its negative contribution. The bars in
this panel are standard errors. For both plots we use logarithmic scale on the horizontal axis and linear
scale on the vertical axis.
6. Empirical results
6.1. A naive view of the exchange member data
We are now ready to examine the empirical data. We begin by showing in Figure 5
the decomposition of the autocorrelation of order flow into its components C ′same(τ) and
C ′other(τ) according to Eq. 4. This is based on exchange membership identifiers alone
– in most cases investors are trading through exchange members as brokers, and all we
can observe is their behavior aggregated together with others trading through the same
broker.
We see that C ′same(τ) is always positive and is substantially larger than C
′
other(τ) at
all lags. This is particularly true for larger lags – by τ = 10, C ′other(τ) is near zero.
This behavior is remarkably consistent across all 102 samples. To illustrate this,
in the left panel of Figure 6 we plot the decomposition C ′(τ) = C ′same(τ) + C
′
other(τ)
averaged across all of the 102 samples, and also plot the standard deviation across the
samples for each time lag. There is remarkably little variation across the samples. The
standard deviations are small compared to the difference between C ′same and C
′
other. For
τ ≤ 100, where we have the best statistical reliability, there is not a single case in which
C ′other(τ) > C
′
same(τ).
26 An inconvenient feature of this model is that Φ and P
′i are not independent, so it is harder to
construct a network with given values of P
′i. As Φ varies from zero to one the trading frequencies of
the brokers necessarily become more concentrated.
23
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
τ
S′′
((ττ))
1 10 100
0
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
Figure 7: The ratio S′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C
′(τ) is compared to a herding null hypothesis. Results averaged
over all 102 samples, corresponding to six different stocks. The bars represent standard deviations across
the 102 samples. The red dashed line corresponds to the behavior of the herding null hypothesis given
in Eq. (18) with parameters matched to the data. The fact that the data are so far from the null
hypothesis suggests that herding cannot explain the data.
The negative value of C ′other observed for AZN is not special to this stock or this time
period: Almost all stocks show similar behavior. To examine this in more detail, in the
right panel of Figure 6 we enlarge the scale and plot only C ′other. Instead of showing the
standard deviation across the samples, we show the standard error. The fact that the
average value of C ′other is consistently negative for 10 ≤ τ ≤ 250, at many lags by more
than three times the standard error, suggests that this effect is real. We will return in
Section 7 to perform better statistical tests and shed some light on the cause of this
phenomenon.
6.2. Comparison to null hypotheses: Can the data be consistent with herding?
The dominance of C ′same over C
′
other naively suggests that splitting is the dominant
cause of the autocorrelation of order flow, and that herding can at best play a minor role.
But is this true? Or are there circumstances where this behavior could be consistent
with herding? We now make use of the models for investors and for brokerage that we
developed in the previous section to try to shed some light on this question by comparing
to specific models of investors and brokerage. By calibrating to the data we can then
ask whether the observed behavior can be explained by a given scenario.
The clarity of the answer is aided by the ubiquity of Eq. (18). As we saw in the
previous section, this corresponds to the following scenarios:
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• Either herding model/fixed random brokerage.
• Any investor model/dynamic random brokerage.
If we calibrate Eq. (18) to the data using the measured values of M ′ and H′ = Var[P ′],
then it predicts the decomposition we should observe under any of these scenarios.
6.2.1. Dependence on lags
In Figure 7 we plot S ′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C
′(τ) as a function of τ . Note that S ′(τ) is
larger than one if C ′other is negative. We show the average result for all 102 samples. For
τ = 1, C ′same(τ) accounts for about 75% of the autocorrelation and C
′
other(τ) explains
about 25%. For larger lags C ′same becomes relatively even more important. For lags larger
than roughly 10, S ′(τ) becomes larger than one because C ′other(τ) becomes negative, and
S ′(τ) rises to about 1.5. This means that C ′same(τ) is about 2.5 times the absolute
value of the C ′other(τ). For large τ the standard deviation across the samples becomes
large because C ′same and particularly C
′
other are small, and we are taking ratios of small
numbers.
This is compared to the null hypothesis of Eq. (18), which is shown as a dashed red
line. For the data S ′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C
′(τ) increases from about 0.7 to 2 with increasing
τ , in contrast to the predicted value, which is roughly 0.06 independent of τ . Thus C ′same
is a factor of 10− 30 higher than predicted under the null hypothesis.
6.2.2. Dependence on heterogeneity
As we have seen, the heterogeneity parameter H′ plays a key role in determining
the degree of distortion due to brokerage. In Figure 8 we compare the data to the null
hypotheses by plotting an average of S ′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C
′(τ) for lags 1 ≤ τ ≤ 50 and
plotting this against the heterogeneity parameter H′. This figure contains several key
results and deserves some detailed discussion.
The black curve indicates Eq. (18), which as stressed above represents several dif-
ferent scenarios that can be used as null hypotheses. S ′(τ) remains close to zero for
small H′, but rises steeply from zero to one when H′ > 10−3. This is because as H′
the distortion increases and gets large C ′same becomes large. Note that the data have
H′ ' 10−3, indicating that we are in a region where the distortion is still small.
The blue circles indicate the generalized private information herding model with fixed
random brokerage, in which the choice of brokerage is correlated to that of neighbors
in the social network. In other words, this represents a worst case scenario in which
investors that tend to imitate each other also tend to choose the same broker. In this
case we also plot the correlation parameter Φ on the vertical axis on the right. (Since
the relation between Φ and S is nonlinear, this has a nonlinear scale). The value of S
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Figure 8: Comparison of the null hypotheses for investor behavior and brokerage maps to real data.
The left vertical axis indicates the ratio S′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C
′(τ) averaged over 1 ≤ τ ≤ 50 and the
horizontal axis is the heterogeneity parameter H′ = Var[P ′], corresponding to the variance of the
brokerage trading frequencies. On the left the trading frequencies are equal and thus the heterogeneity
H′ is small, and on the right trading is concentrated in a few brokerages and the variance is large.
The 102 data samples (indicated by red x’s) are compared to the predictions of three different null
hypotheses. The null hypotheses are generated by combining a model for investor herding with a
model of brokerage. The black curve is the public information model and Fixed Random Brokerage;
alternatively it represents the prediction of the Dynamically Random Brokerage (DRB) model under
any investor model. The blue circles represent simulations of the private information herding model
with Fixed Random Brokerage (FRB), with the correlation Φ between the brokerage choice and trading
signal shown on the right vertical axis. Under any brokerage model all 102 samples are outside the
range predicted by any of the null hypotheses that involve herding.
under this null hypothesis increases roughly linearly as a function of the heterogeneity
parameter H′, and due to the correlation, this is a stricter null hypothesis.
The value for each data sample is represented by a red “x” in Figure 8. The data
samples are well-separated from the null hypotheses in all 102 cases, indicating that
none of them can explain the data. The only null hypothesis that comes close is the one
that correlates order placement under private information with broker choice. A few of
the samples are close to this null hypothesis, but most of them have values of S that are
a factor of two or three greater. Note also that in order to even come close, for these
samples it is necessary to assume that the correlation between trading and broker choice
is the order of 60%, which seems high.
To summarize, the results in this section make it clear that we can strongly reject
both (1) herding with fixed random brokerage (even when imitation and brokerage choice
are correlated) and (2) dynamically random brokerage. In a certain sense these bracket
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the way in which investors can choose brokers. In case (1) the investors are highly
faithful to their brokers, in case (2) they are not faithful at all. We are able to reject
(2) because dynamically random brokerage looks indistinguishable from herding. Thus
if we had observed a large correlation C ′other, we would not have been able to reject
this possibility. The inference problem is highly asymmetric: Splitting leaves a clear
signal that is not distorted by fixed random brokerage, and at the same time is easy to
distinguish from dynamical random brokerage.
Our analysis allows us to make inferences about the nature of brokerage choice, which
is interesting in and of itself. The fact that the dynamically random brokerage model
is so strongly rejected makes it clear that investors do not randomize their brokerage
choice. In order to observe the large values of S ′(τ) seen here it must be the case that
they must have a substantial degree of consistency in choosing brokers, and that the
typical investor only uses a small number of brokers.
6.3. Can the splitting scenario explain the data?
We have seen that the herding null hypotheses are rejected by the data, but what
about the splitting null hypothesis? As already discussed in the introduction, the order
splitting model of Lillo, Mike, and Farmer (2005) is capable of matching the empirical
autocorrelation C ′(τ) quite well. The splitting ratio of this model is S ′(τ) = 1, inde-
pendent of τ and independent of the brokerage map. This ratio is somewhat too high
for τ ≤ 5, where S ≈ 0.7. This could be due to one of two reasons, that we cannot
distinguish: (1) Some short term herding behavior or (2) partially dynamic brokerage
choice27. For τ ≥ 10 the splitting ratio S ′(τ) = 1 predicted under the order splitting
scenario is actually too low, due to the negative contribution of the herding component.
Thus, the order splitting model explains the basic fact of the dominance of order split-
ting, but to get a better match to the data one would need to include other effects, such
as a small component of herding, allowing the possibility of negative contributions to
herding, and partially dynamic brokerage (i.e. allowing investors to split their trading
across a few brokers, which gives the appearance of herding).
6.4. The evolution of splitting versus herding through the decade
During the last decade there has been an enormous rise in the use of algorithmic
brokerages, which take large institutional orders, split them into small pieces and execute
27 By partially dynamic brokerage choice we mean that some investors (but not others) might ran-
domly vary their brokers, or investors might have partial allegiance to a small set of brokers, randomly
choosing between them but avoiding the others. As the magnitude of the random choice increases so
does the herding component, and as we know from the previous scenario, unless a single brokerage
dominates the trading (which is not the case for the real data), this strongly distorts the decomposition
toward Cother.
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Figure 9: The evolution of order splitting versus herding throughout the decade. For each six month
period we compute the splitting ratio S′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C
′(τ) averaged over 1 ≤ τ ≤ 50 for each of the
stocks in our data set. The red line with stars shows the average of the splitting ratios in each period,
and the blue solid line is a linear regression. The regression is negative, suggesting the dominance
of splitting over herding is actually decreasing slightly through time (and in any case is clearly not
increasing).
them incrementally. One might expect this activity to be reflected in an increase in order
splitting over the course of our ten year data set, which covers 2000 - 2009.
To investigate this we compute the splitting ratio S ′(τ) = C ′same(τ)/C
′(τ) for each
of the stocks in our data set in each half-year. The result is shown in Figure 9.
The surprising result is that we observe no increase in the average splitting ratio with
time – in fact, a linear regression indicates a slight decrease. The only possible exception
is Vodafone, which shows an increase from 2006-2009 (but experienced a substantial
decrease during the first two years). These results indicate that, at least in comparison
to herding, order splitting was a common activity even before the widespread use of
algorithmic trading, and that the rise of algorithmic trading has been a relatively small
effect.
6.5. Heterogeneity of individual members
In this section we study the behavior of individual exchange members and show that
their behavior is remarkably consistent, with a few exceptions. The decomposition of
Eq. (3) makes it clear that persistence in order flow is driven by two factors: persis-
tence in order sign, measured by Cij(τ), and persistence in activity, measured by P ij(τ).
Because they appear multiplicatively, both factors are needed to get a large autocorrela-
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Figure 10: Heterogeneity of the contribution of individual exchange members (labeled by i) in the
diagonal component of the autocorrelation of order flow. Following the decomposition of Eq. (3), on the
left we plot C ′ii(τ), which measures persistence in trading direction and on the right we plot P˜ ′ii(τ),
which measures persistence in activity. We show data for the 15 most active members for AZN for the
first half of 2009, using distinctive symbols to indicate each member (consistently in both plots). For
one of the members (labeled by diamonds) C ′ii(τ) decays more quickly than the others and for some
values of τ > 10 is negative, hence the diamonds cannot be plotted on logarithmic scale and cannot be
connected. This member is the fifth most active.
tion. Insofar as splitting is dominant over herding the diagonal terms Cii(τ) and P ii(τ)
will dominate the contribution due to the off-diagonal terms.
To understand how these vary across the members of the exchange, in Figure 10 we
show C ′ii(τ) and P˜ ′ii(τ) for the 15 most active members.
The patterns for trading sign are consistent in most cases. C ′ii(τ) decays very slowly,
but the curves tend to steepen slightly with increasing τ . There are three members for
which C ′ii(τ) decays faster than the others, and two members in particular for which
the behavior is dramatically different, suggesting that these members follow a different
business model.
The integral of P˜ ′ii(τ) can be seen as a measure of the activity clustering, thus large
values indicate that when the corresponding member becomes active, it will likely per-
sist in this state. The right panel of Figure 10 shows that for P˜ ′ii(τ) all of the members
show strikingly similar behavior; the individual curves are fairly straight and parallel to
each other. Since we are plotting the data on double logarithmic scale, the straightness
of the lines indicates that the individual exchange members are all reasonably well ap-
proximated as a power law, and the fact that the lines are parallel indicates an exponent
that is independent of the exchange member. The offsets indicate differences in scale.
Thus from the point of view of patterns of trading activity, all members behave in more
or less the same manner. This indicates that the activity clustering of all members be-
haves similarly except for scale. The scale varies by nearly an order of magnitude, and
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Figure 11: Persistence in activity. The joint probability of activity P ′ij(τ = 1) as a function of P ′iP ′j ,
the hypothetical joint probability under the assumption of independence. Each symbol indicates a given
pair of members i and j for AZN during the first half of 2009. Diagonal elements i = j are indicated
by blue crosses and off-diagonal elements i 6= j by black circles. The plot is on double logarithmic
scale. For comparison the identity line P ′ij(τ) = P ′iP ′j is shown as a solid black line. The fact that
the diagonal elements P ′ii(τ) consistently lie well above the identity line is consistent with the large
contribution of splitting. In contrast the off-diagonal elements P ′ij (with i 6= j) tend to cluster along
or even slightly below the identity line.
is strongly correlated with the trading volume of the member. The Spearman rho of
P ′i, which measures the trading volume, and P˜ ′ii(1), which measures the persistence, is
typically very high, for example 0.92 for AZN in the first half of 2009. Because (P ′i)2 is
subtracted in computing P˜ ′ii, such a large correlation is not automatic. This indicates
that the most active members also tend to trade in a more clustered manner than the
less active firms, i.e. if they become active, they tend to remain active, and vice versa.
In contrast Cii and P i are essentially uncorrelated, as are C ′ii(1) and P˜ ′ii(1), indicating
that trading direction and trading activity are uncorrelated.
A different method of visualizing the heterogeneity of trading activity is presented in
Figure 11. We plot P ′ij(τ = 1) against P ′iP ′j for all pairs of members i and j. If there
is no coordination between the activity of different brokers, we expect the off-diagonal
elements i 6= j (shown as black circles) to be close to the identity line. This is indeed
precisely what is observed; the off-diagonal elements are somewhat below the identity
line, corresponding to the negative contribution of herding. The diagonal elements i = j,
in contrast, are well above the identity (shown as blue x’s). This shows that there is
strong persistence in the activity of brokers, but little coordination between the activities
of different brokers. Larger values of τ show similar behavior though with somewhat
smaller amplitude.
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These results indicate that the persistence of order flow stems from the persistence
in both trading direction and activity of individual members of the exchange. They
also show that the dominance of splitting over herding is also apparent in the activity
level P ′ij, where we see that the diagonal elements P ′ii dominate over the off-diagonal
elements P ′ij with i 6= j.
7. Clues about the cause of the negative contribution of herding
As we have shown in Section 6, the herding component of the order flow autocorre-
lation is often negative for τ > 10. This implies that buying by one investor tends to
invoke subsequent selling by other investors. In this section we first test the statistical
significance of this phenomenon and then perform some empirical investigations that
give a clue as to its origin.
7.1. The negative contribution of herding is statistically significant
To assess whether the negative contribution of herding is statistically significant we
perform a one-sided significance test by comparing the real data to the null hypothesis
that both the order signs and brokerage codes are assigned randomly. Realizations of
this null hypothesis are obtained by randomly shuffling both the signs and brokerage
codes. For each of the 102 datasets we produced 106 realizations of the null hypothesis,
and for each realization we computed the splitting and herding components of the auto-
correlation. Then for each lag τ we estimated the fraction of random realizations having
a herding component smaller than the value observed in the corresponding real sample.
If this fraction is smaller than 5%, we reject the one-sided null hypothesis. Figure 12
shows the fraction of sets for which we reject the null hypothesis. For small values of τ
we never reject the hypothesis because the real herding component of the autocorrela-
tion function is significantly positive – this is expected since we do not observe negative
contributions in this region. For values of τ between roughly 15 and 80 we reject the
null hypothesis in approximately 80% of the sets. This means that for these lags the
negativity of the herding component of the autocorrelation is statistically significant.
We now explore the possible origin of this phenomenon.
7.2. What underlies the negative contribution of herding?
We now show that the negative contribution of herding is associated with a difference
in the response of brokers to market orders, depending on whether or not the order
changes the price and whether or not it is from the same or a different broker. In
particular we find that if a market order placed by broker i changes the price, broker j
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Figure 12: Statistical significance of the negative contribution of herding. The vertical axis plots the
fraction of the 102 data sets for which the herding component of the autocorrelation C ′other has a p
value less than 5% under the IID null hypothesis as a function of the lag τ .
is less likely to place market orders in the same direction, while the behavior of broker
i is unchanged28.
We use the notation MO0t for a market order at time t that does not change the
price and MO′t for a market order that changes the price. Conditioned on either of these
events, the probabilities for subsequent market orders to have the same sign are
P (t = t+τ | MO0t )
P (t = t+τ | MO′t) (19)
Assuming that on average buy and sell trades are equally likely and that brokers’ inven-
tories are bounded, these probabilities for large τ should converge to the unconditional
probability P (t) = 1/2. In Figure 13 these are shown for AZN, plotted as a function
of τ on a double logarithmic scale. To make the τ dependence clearer, we also plot the
excess probabilities
P˜ 0(τ) ≡ P (t = t+τ | MO0t )− 1/2
P˜ ′(τ) ≡ P (t = t+τ | MO′t)− 1/2.
28 The notion that whether or not a market order changes the price is an important factor was inspired
in part by a previous study by Eisler, Bouchaud, and Kockelkoren (2011b); see also To´th et al. (2012).
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Figure 13: Probability that market orders at times t and t + τ have the same sign, conditioned
on whether or not the first market order changed the price. The case of no price change is given
by P (t = t+τ |MO0t ) (represented by circles) and the case of a price change by P (t = t+τ |MO′t)
(represented by ”x”). The plots on the left and right are the same, except that on the right we subtract
the unconditional probability P (t) = 1/2 to make the functional dependence on time and the difference
in the convergence rates clearer. When the original market order changes the price, the decay is much
faster. Data is for AZN for 2000-2009.
The decay of both P˜ 0 and P˜ ′ is approximately a power law. However, when the original
market order changes the price, the decay is faster. This means that, all else being equal,
when a market order does not change the price the persistence of the sign of subsequent
orders is much stronger than when it does change the price.
We now study how the identity of the broker affects this behavior. We look at
the probability that the signs of the orders at t and t + τ are the same, conditioned on
whether they were placed by the same broker and also on whether the event at t changed
the price or not. We study the following probabilities:
P (it = 
j
t+τ | i = j ; MO0t ) P (it = jt+τ | i 6= j ; MO0t )
P (it = 
j
t+τ | i = j ; MO′t) P (it = jt+τ | i 6= j ; MO′t) (20)
In Figure 14 we plot the probabilities above on a double logarithmic scale. When
the broker at time t and t + τ is the same there is no qualitative difference, regardless
of whether the order at time t changed the price, other than a small shift in scale.
In contrast, when different brokers place the orders at time t and t+ τ , the behavior
changes dramatically. If the market order at time t does not change the price, the
probability that the signs of the two orders are the same is lower than before, but still
higher than 1/2. In contrast, if the market order at time t changes the price, for most
lags τ the subsequent order is more likely to have the opposite sign. Thus, after a market
order that does not change the price, other brokers tend to place their orders in the same
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Figure 14: The probability that market order signs separated by lag τ are the same, conditioned on
whether the members placing the orders are the same and whether or not the first market order changes
the price, as described in Eq. (20). Left panel : i = j: The same member places the order at t and t+ τ .
If the market order at time t changes the price (MO
′
t, represented by ”x”) the behavior is nearly the
same as if it does not change the price (MO0t , represented by ”o”), other than a slight shift in scale.
Right panel : i 6= j: Different members place the order at t and t+ τ . Whether or not the market order
at time t changes the price now makes a big difference in the behavior. After an event that does not
change the price, other brokers tend to put their order in the same direction with a probability higher
than 0.5. After an event that changes the price, in contrast, at most lags it is slightly more probable
that other brokers put their orders in the opposite direction. Data is for AZN for 2000-2009.
direction, indicating a slight herding on short time scales. In contrast, after a market
order that changes the price, the opposite happens: they are more likely to put their
orders in the opposite direction, causing negative autocorrelations.
This is confirmed by decomposing the autocorrelation conditional on whether or not
the market order at time t changed the price, shown in Figure 15. More precisely, we
apply the decomposition of Eq. (5) to the conditional autocorrelations E[(t−µ)(t+τ −
µ)|MO0t ] and E[(t−µ)(t+τ−µ)|MO′t], where µ is the mean market order sign. When the
market order at t does not change the price, Cother(τ) decays to zero but never becomes
very negative; in contrast, when the market order at t changes price, it is negative for
roughly τ > 5. The shape of Cother(τ) is qualitatively similar to the probabilities shown
in Figure 14.
The conclusion is that the observed negative contribution of Cother(τ) is related to
the difference in the response of agents to market orders placed by others, depending
on whether or not they changed the price. When a market order does not cause a price
change, agents continue being more likely to place orders of the same sign, regardless
of who placed the original market order. In contrast, if a market order triggers a price
change, other agents place fewer market orders in the same direction than in the opposite
direction. The interesting point is that splitting traders seem to act like “noise traders”,
i.e. they do not adapt their behavior to their own impact. The reason for this could be
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Figure 15: Csame(τ) vs. Cother(τ) components of the autocorrelation function of market order signs
conditional on the event at time t. The left panel is conditioned on the case where the original market
order does not change the price, and the right panel is the case where it does. The negative contribution
to Cother(τ) is entirely due to the latter case. Data is for AZN for 2000-2009.
that they have already calculated their impact in their estimates of the trading cost, so it
is expected. For a discussion on the possible microstructural mechanims see also To´th et
al. (2012) and Taranto et al. (2014). We are still far from a fully satisfactory explanation
of the large variety of limit order book mechanisms responsible for the observed behavior.
One possible explanation is that when the price moves up, for example, other agents,
which were previously buying with market orders, switch to buying with limit orders
placed into the enlarged spread. This increases the bid, making the use of market orders
more favorable for sellers. The combined effect of the decrease of buyers using market
orders and the increase of sellers facing a more favorable price could explain the negative
correlation observed in the right panel of Figure. 15.
8. Conclusions
We have shown that in the LSE the cause of the extreme persistence of order flow
on short timescales (corresponding to 500 transactions or less, typically about an hour)
is overwhelmingly due to autocorrelated trading by individual members of the exchange
rather than interactions between them. The fact that bursts of orders of the same sign
mainly come from a single member, rather than several members, suggests that on these
timescales herding is dominated by order splitting. We observe behavior at very short
time scales that can be interpreted as herding, but for longer times this goes to zero,
and indeed, we often observe that the order flow of a given exchange member is actually
anti-correlated with that of others. We should make the caveat that we are only able to
obtain statistically significant results for fairly short time scales of less than a few hours.
This makes it quite possible that herding is a stronger factor on longer timescales.
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Our analysis is based on a decomposition of the autocorrelation function into a com-
ponent due to cross-correlation of different investors and a component due to autocorre-
lation of investors with themselves. We apply this to data identifying the members of the
exchange, who often act as brokers for other investors. In order to understand whether
these results apply to single investors we developed a set of models for investor behavior
and brokerage choice. We combine these into scenarios with different combinations of
investor behavior and brokerage, and use them as null hypotheses. The herding null
hypotheses are strongly rejected by the data; in contrast, splitting is not rejected. We
believe that this shows that, even though our analysis was done at the level of brokers,
the main conclusion applies at the level of investors as well.
The methods that we have developed here have implications beyond this study. Data
with brokerage information is more widespread than data about investors. The methods
that we have developed here provide a proof of principle for how brokerage data can
be used to infer properties of investor behavior. For example, we show that under
the extreme assumption of dynamically random choice of brokers, in which investors
randomly choose new brokers at each time step, the autocorrelation of order flow gives
the appearance of strong herding. The fact that the brokerage data strongly favors order
splitting over herding shows that real brokerage choices must be very different than the
dynamically random model. This result makes it clear that investors do not randomize
their brokerage choice, but are rather consistent in their choice of brokers. Instead the
data is consistent with the idea that investors use only a small number of brokers who
they are consistent with through time. This is in line with evidence from Linnainmaa
and Saar (2012) and Fong et al. (2014).
Our results here are consistent with the hypothesis that the origin of long memory in
order flow is mainly due to investors who consistently execute their large orders through
at most a few brokers, splitting them into small pieces. This is exactly what one expects
from algorithmic execution engines, who take large orders, split them into pieces and
execute them throughout the day through their own brokers. Interestingly, however,
despite the increase in usage of algorithmic brokers, we do not observe any increase in
Csame(τ) vs. Cother(τ) during the ten year period of our study. The behavior is extremely
consistent across different stocks and time periods. It is also fairly consistent across
member firms. While a few member firms have less directional persistence than others,
the vast majority are quite persistent, and in an almost identical way. Furthermore the
persistence exhibits itself similarly in both trading direction and trading activity.
As discussed in the introduction, an important consequence of autocorrelated order
flow is its effect on market impact. As shown by Farmer et al. (2013) this can result
in rather precise (and hence sharply testable) predictions for the functional form and
dynamic behavior of market impact. For this the origin of the persistence of order flow
matters: If it were due to herding the implications would be substantially different.
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Under the interpretation that the strong positive autocorrelation of investors is due
to order splitting, the fact that investors split their orders so strongly implies that typ-
ically the market is in a certain sense out of equilibrium. That is, if investors revealed
their intentions when they made decisions, rather than concealing their intentions and
revealing them only gradually, prices at any given moment might be substantially dif-
ferent than observed prices. Understanding the implications of this remarkably robust
and widespread phenomenon deserves closer attention.
Acknowledgments
We thank Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Andrew Lo and Terry Odean for useful com-
ments, and National Science Foundation grant 0624351 for support. Any opinions,
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. FL acknowledges
financial support from the grant SNS11LILLB “Price formation, agent’s heterogeneity,
and market efficiency”.
References
Axioglou, C., and S. Skouras, 2011, Markets change every day: Evidence from the
memory of trade direction, Journal of Empirical Finance 18, 423–446.
Banerjee, A.V., 1992, A simple model of herd behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics
107, 797–817.
Banerjee, A.V., 1993, The economics of rumours, Review of economic studies 60, 309.
Barabasi, A.-L., R. Albert, and H. Jeong, 1999, Mean-field theory for scale-free random
networks, Physica A 272, 173–189.
Barber, B., T. Odean, and N. Zhu, 2009, Systemic Noise, Journal of Financial Markets
12, 547–569.
Beran, J., 1994, Statistics for Long-Memory Processes. (Chapman & Hall New York).
Biais, B., P. Hillion, and C. Spatt, 1995, An empirical analysis of the limit order book
and order flow in the Paris bourse, Journal of Finance 50, 1655–1689.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, 1992, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, The Journal of Political Economy,
100, 992–1026.
Boehmer, E., Wu, J., 2008, Order flow and prices, Working paper, Texas A&M Univer-
sity
37
Bouchaud, J-P, J. Doyne Farmer, and F. Lillo, 2009, How markets slowly digest changes
in supply and demand, in T. Hens, and K. Schenk-Hoppe, eds.: Handbook of Financial
Markets: Dynamics and Evolution (Elsevier, ).
Bouchaud, J-P., Y. Gefen, M. Potters, and M. Wyart, 2004, Fluctuations and response in
financial markets: The subtle nature of “random” price changes, Quantitative Finance
4, 176–190.
Bouchaud, J-P., J. Kockelkoren, and M. Potters, 2006, Random walks, liquidity molasses
and critical response in financial markets, Quantitative Finance 6, 115–123.
Brown, P. Walsh, D. and Yuen, A., 1997, The interaction between order imbalance and
stock price, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 5, 539–557
Carollo, A., G. Vaglica, F. Lillo, and R. Mantegna, 2012, Trading activity and price
impact in parallel markets: SETS vs. off-book market at the London Stock Exchange,
Quantitative Finance 12, 517–530.
Chan, L. K.C., and J. Lakonishok, 1993, Institutional trades and intraday stock price
behavior, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 173–199.
Chan, L. K.C., and J. Lakonishok, 1995, The behavior of stock prices around institu-
tional trades, Journal of Finance 50, 1147–1174.
Chordia, T., Roll, R., and Subrahmanyam, A., 2008, Liquidity and market efficiency,
Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 249–268
Chordia, T., Subrahmanyam, A., 2004, Order imbalance and individual stock returns:
Theory and evidence, Journal of Financial Economics, 72, 485–518
Chordia, T., Roll, R., and Subrahmanyam, A., 2002, Order imbalance, liquidity, and
market returns, Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 111–130
Chordia, T., Roll, R., and Subrahmanyam, A., 2005, Evidence on the speed of conver-
gence to market efficiency, Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 271–292
Cont, R., and J-P. Bouchaud, 2000, Herd behavior and aggregate fluctuations in financial
markets, Macroeconomic Dynamics 4, 170–196.
Danielsson, J., and R. Payne, 2012, Liquidity determination in an order-driven market,
The European Journal of Finance, 18:9, 799–821
Eisler, Z., J-P. Bouchaud, and J. Kockelkoren, 2011a, Models for the impact of all order
book events, Working paper, arXiv:1107.3364.
Eisler, Z., J.-P. Bouchaud, and J. Kockelkoren, 2011b, The price impact of order book
events: market orders, limit orders and cancellations, Quantitative Finance pp. 1–25
arXiv:0904.0900.
38
Ellul, A., C. Holden, P. Jain, and R. Jennings, 2007, A comprehensive test of order
choice theory: Recent evidence from the NYSE, Journal of Empirical Finance 14,
636–661.
Farmer, J.D., A. Gerig, F. Lillo, and S. Mike, 2006, Market efficiency and the long-
memory of supply and demand: Is price impact variable and permanent or fixed and
temporary?, Quantitative Finance 6, 107–112.
Farmer, J. Doyne, A. Gerig, F. Lillo, and H. Waelbroeck, 2013, How efficiency shapes
market impact, Quantitative Finance, 13:11, 1743-1758.
Fong, Y.L., D. Gallagher, and A. Lee, 2014, Individual Investors and Broker Types,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming.
Gatheral, J., 2010, No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact, Quantitative Finance 10,
749–759.
Gerig, A.N., 2007, A Theory for Market Impact: How Order Flow Affects Stock Price,
Ph.D. thesis University of Illinois.
Hansch, O., N.Y. Naik, and S. Viswanathan, 1998, Do Inventories Matter in Dealership
Markets? Evidence from the London Stock Exchange, The Journal of Finance 53,
1623–1656.
Hirshleifer, D., A. Subrahmanyam, and S. Titman, 1994, Security Analysis and Trading
Patterns when Some Investors Receive Information Before Others, Journal of Finance
49, 1665–1698.
Huberman, G., and W. Stanzl, 2004, Price manipulation and quasi-arbitrage, Econo-
metrica 72, 1247–1275.
Iori, G., 2002, A microsimulation of traders activity in the stock market: the role of
heterogeneity, agents’ interactions and trade frictions., Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 49, 269–285.
Kirman, A.P., and G. Teyssiere, 2002, Microeconomic models for long memory in the
volatility of financial time series, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics 5,
281–302.
Kyle, A. S., 1985, Continuous auctions and insider trading, Econometrica 53, 1315–1335.
Lakonishok, J., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, 1992, The Impact of Institutional Trading
on Stock Prices, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 23–43.
LeBaron, B., and R. Yamamoto, 2007, Long-memory in an order-driven market, Physica
A 383, 85–89.
39
LeBaron, B., and R. Yamamoto, 2008, The Impact of Imitation on Long-Memory in an
Order-Driven Market., Eastern Economic Journal of Econometrics 34, 504–517.
Lee, Y.T., Liu, Y.J., Roll, R., and Subrahmanyam, A., 2004, Order Imbalances and
Market Efficiency: Evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 39, 327–341.
Lillo, F., and J. D. Farmer, 2004, The long memory of the efficient market, Studies in
Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics 8.
Lillo, F., S. Mike, and J. D. Farmer, 2005, Theory for long memory in supply and
demand, Physical Review E 7106, 066122.
Linnainmaa, J., and G. Saar, 2012, Lack of Anonymity and the Inference from Order
Flow, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1414–1456.
Lo, K., Coggins, R., 2006, Effects of order flow imbalance on short-horizon contrarian
strategies in the Australian equity market, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 14, 291–310
Lu, Y.C., and H. Fang, 2012, UK fund manager cascading and herding behaviour: New
evidence from the stock market, Working Paper
Lyons, R., 1997, A simultaneous trade model of the foreign exchange hot potato, Journal
of International Economics 42, 275–298.
Moro, E., L. G. Moyano, J. Vicente, A. Gerig, J. D. Farmer, G. Vaglica, F. Lillo, and
R.N. Mantegna, 2009, Market impact and trading protocols of hidden orders in stock
markets, Physical Review E. 80, 066102.
Orlean, A., 1995, Bayesian interactions and collective dynamics of opinion: Herd be-
havior and mimetic contagion., Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 28,
257–274.
Raafat, R., N. Chater, and C. Frith, 2009, Herding in Humans, Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 13, 420–428.
Scharfstein, D.S, and J.C. Stein, 1990, Herd behavior and investment, American Eco-
nomic Review 80, 465–479.
Simon, H. A., 1955, On a class of skew distribution functions, Biometrika 42, 425–440.
Taranto, D.E., G. Bormetti, and F. Lillo, 2014, The adaptive nature of liquidity tak-
ing in limit order books, Journal of Statistical Mechanics (in press), preprint at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1403.0842.
Taylor, N., 2003, Competition on the London Stock Exchange, European Financial Man-
agement 8, 399–419.
40
Tedeschi, G., G. Iori, and M. Gallegati, 2009, The role of communication and imitation
in limit order markets, The European Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter and
Complex Systems 71, 489–497.
Toth, B., Z. Eisler, F. Lillo, J-P. Bouchaud, J. Kockelkoren, and J.D. Farmer, 2012, How
does the market react to your order flow? Quantitative Finance 12:7, 1015-1024.
Toth, B., Y. Lemperiere, C. Deremble, J. de Lataillade, J. Kockelkoren, and J-P.
Bouchaud, 2011, Anomalous price impact and the critical nature of liquidity in fi-
nancial markets, Physical Review X 1, 021006.
Vaglica, G., F. Lillo, E. Moro, and R. Mantegna, 2008, Scaling laws of strategic behavior
and size heterogeneity in agent dynamics, Physical Review E 77, 0036110.
Wermers, R., 1999, Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices, Journal of
Finance 55, 581–622.
Yamamoto, R., 2011, Order aggressiveness, pre-trade transparency, and long memory in
an order-driven market, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35, 1938–1963.
Yeo, Wee Yong, 2008, Serial correlation in the limit order flow:
Causes and impact, in FMA European Conference (Prague).
http://69.175.2.130/∼finman/Prague/Papers/SCorLOFCI.pdf.
Appendix
Derivation of autocorrelation decomposition
The derivation is a trivial decomposition of the autocorrelation function into its
pieces when the order flow can be labeled by the identity of the agent i placing the
order.
C(τ) =
1
N
∑
t
tt+τ −
(
1
N
∑
t
t
)2
=
1
N
∑
t
∑
i,j
it
j
t+τ −
(
1
N
∑
t
∑
i
it
)2
.
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Since by definition P i = N i/N and P ij = N ij/N , by interchanging the order of sums
this can be rewritten as
C(τ) =
∑
i,j
P ij(τ)
[
1
N ij(τ)
∑
t
it
j
t+τ
]
−
(∑
i
P i
1
N i
∑
t
it
)2
=
∑
i,j
(
P ij(τ)
[
1
N ij(τ)
∑
t
it
j
t+τ
]
− P iP j
[
1
N i
∑
t
it
][
1
N j
∑
t
jt
])
.
The autocorrelation function can then be written
C(τ) =
∑
i,j
P ij(τ)Cij(τ) +
∑
i,j
P˜ ij(τ)µiµj.
Distortion of order flow decomposition by brokerage
Defining all notation in analogy with that for single investor order flow, for conve-
nience assume µ′i = 0 for all i. Then the autocorrelation for the order flow between
brokerage i at time t and brokerage j at time t+ τ is
C ′ij(τ) =
1
N ′ij(τ)
∑
t
′it 
′j
t+τ . (21)
Using the definition of the brokerage map, Eq. (12), and for convenience not explicitly
stating the dependence of all the terms on τ , this can be rewritten in terms of single
investor order flow as
C ′ij =
1
N ′ij
∑
kl
NklBikBjl
1
Nkl
∑
t
kt 
l
t+τ =
N
N ′ij
∑
kl
BikBjlP
klCkl. (22)
The relation
C ′(τ) =
∑
i,j
P ′ij(τ)C ′ij(τ), (23)
is analogous to Eq. (3) for single investor order flow and is true by similar arguments.
By definition P ′ij = N ′ij/N ′ and the total number of orders coming out of brokerages is
the same as that for single investors, i.e. N ′ = N . Substituting all of these into Eq. (23)
gives
C ′(τ) =
∑
i,j,k,l
BikBjlP
klCkl. (24)
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